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NEW YORK'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE CRISES-A NEW DIRECTION FOR
REFORM
I. Introduction
Beginning in the early 1970's, insurance companies nationwide
began dropping out of the medical malpractice market.' Medical
malpractice had become an unprofitable field for investment 2 partly
because of a sharp and continuing increase both in the number of
malpractice suits being brought against health-care providers and in
the size of damage awards and settlements in medical malpractice
cases.' In response to increasing pressure from the medical profession
and the insurance industry, many states in the mid-1970's began to
experiment with ways of limiting the number of claims being entered
against physicians and hospitals, and reducing the size of malpractice
awards and settlements.4 New York passed its first medical mal-
practice reforms in 1974.' Despite these initial efforts, malpractice
1. Kleinfield, Profits are Dwindling as Claims Reach Record Levels, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at C4, col. 4. "The first [medical malpractice insurance]
crisis of a decade ago had to do with availability .... [D]ozens of commercial
insurers stopped writing malpractice policies and some physicians simply couldn't
find coverage." Id.; T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 1-2 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE].
2. In 1975, Andrew Kalmykow, counsel for the American Insurance Association,
stated:
The most recent figures issued by the Insurance Services Office, the
national statistical and rating agency for the insurance industry, indicate
that losses, that is, payouts to claimants and defense costs, alone will
exceed 150 percent of the total premiums received. In other words,
companies writing this business will have to pay out 50 percent more in
losses than they received in premiums.
3. Brinkley, AMA Study Finds Big Rise in Claims for Malpractice, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 4. The author states:
Americans are filing more than three times as many medical malpractice
claims as they did ten years ago, and are winning record settlements
.... After a marked decline in the late 1970's, A.M.A. and insurance
industry statistics show, 16 malpractice claims were filed for every 100
doctors in 1983, about 20 percent more than the year before. In 1975,
at the height of what was then called a medical malpractice crisis, fewer
than five claims were filed for every 100 doctors.
Id.
4. For a discussion of these statutes and their similarities to certain provisions
of Program Bill No. 75 ("the Bill"), see infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of New York's first attempt to reform the medical mal-
practice tort claims system, see infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
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insurance premiums, 6 the number of suits being brought against
physicians,7 and the size of damage awards8 all continued to increase.
New York then attempted to address this continuing problem through
Program Bill No. 75 [hereinafter "the Bill"] which Governor Cuomo
signed into law on July 2, 1985. 9 Thus, New York launched its
second attempt to reform its medical malpractice tort claims systems.' 0
Present and past reform efforts both in New York and in other
states have concentrated on reducing malpractice insurance premiums
by limiting awards and hindering access to litigation, but have failed
to address the most important flaws in the medical malpractice tort
6. From 1975 to 1983, insurance premiums had been increasing at the rate of
twenty percent per year. Sullivan, Doctors' Insurers Win 52% Rate Rise, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as 52 Percent Rate Rise].
In 1985, rate increases in excesss of fifty percent were approved for the Medical
Malpractice Mutual Insurance Association and the Medical Liability Mutual In-
surance Company, the major insurers of physicians in New York State. Id. A 52
percent increase applied to 900 doctors insured by one of the smallest insurers in
the state, the Medical Liability Insurance Association. The increase granted to the
association was for 41 percent retroactive to July 1983, and eight percent retroactive
to July 1984. Id. at B4, col. 3. Retroactively, the two increases equalled a 52
percent rate increase. Id. A 55 percent increase in medical malpractice insurance
rates was awarded to the Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, which provides
most of the medical malpractice insurance in New York. Sullivan, 55 Percent Rise
in Medical Malpractice Rates Granted, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1985, at B2, col. 2.
Thus, the amount a Long Island obstetrician paid for malpractice insurance rose
from $54,282 to $82,500 a year. See 52 Percent Rate Rise, supra at Al, col. 2.
7. See supra note 3.
8. The amount of the average damage award in New York has increased since
1977 as follows: 1977-$33,156; 1978-$42,042; 1979-$51,776; 1980-$60,711; 1981-
$71,565; 1982-$96,084; 983-$99,059; 1984-$108,846. Telephone interview with Shir-
ley Connell, Public Relations, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co., in New
York City (July 19, 1985).
9. 1985 N.Y. LAWS ch. 294. Fot a complete text of the Bill see N.Y.L.J.,
July 3, 1985, at 17, col. 1. Although all provisions of the Bill apply to both
medical and dental malpractice, the scope of this article will be limited to a discussion
of the Bill's repercussions on medical malpractice.
10. Critics of the present tort claims system state that the current explosion of
malpractice litigation is primarily responsible for a steady rise in malpractice in-
surance premiums. See Taylor, Medical Malpractice Costs Debated at Hearing,
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1984, at A23, col. 1. Witnesses at a Senate hearing, held
on July 10, 1984, called for federal legislation to limit malpractice lawsuits and
head off what they called a potential "crisis of affordability" for malpractice
insurance. Id. Supporters of the tort claims system look to other causes to account
for increasing malpractice insurance premiums. For example, Thomas Bendorf,
director of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, stated that "insurance
companies had made large profits by charging excessive premiums." d. Others
claim that the malpractice insurance crisis simply does not exist. Republican Senator
Dan Quayle of Indiana noted "that malpractice insurance remained
relatively constant as a percentage of physicians' income since 1970, averaging
about 3 percent." Id.
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claims system." These flaws include a failure to compensate most
victims of medical accidents, a failure to compensate promptly, and
a failure to compensate without undue expense. 2 Furthermore, the
tort claims system has had a number of deleterious side-effects on
the medical profession, including the proliferation of defensive med-
icine. 3 In contrast, a no-fault system of compensation would provide
immediate compensation to a larger number of those injured as the
result of medical accidents.' 4 In addition, such a system would
eliminate the physician's need to protect himself in ways that are
ultimately costly or otherwise harmful to the health care consumer."'
Experts have not yet determined whether a no-fault system of re-
covery would, in the long run, be more successful in reducing
malpractice insurance premiums than past and current reforms. 6
Such an innovation, however, would address the most glaring flaws
in our current system of malpractice compensation. 7
This Note will first examine the courts' response to malpractice
reform legislation, focusing on other states' counterparts to the Bill's
major provisions." This Note will then examine the history of the
malpractice crisis in New York State, including a discussion of the
first reform efforts. 9 Furthermore, this Note will discuss the Bill's
major provisions in terms of their stated purpose and their relation
to prior law.20 Finally, this Note will examine the Bill's probable
impact on the malpractice problem, the Bill's major shortcomings,
and an alternative direction for future reform efforts. 2'
II. State Response to the Malpractice Insurance Crisis
All fifty states responded to the malpractice insurance crisis by
enacting a wide variety of reforms,22 many of which were aimed at
11. See generally Comment, Medical Malpractice Damage Awards: The Need
For a Dual Approach, 11 FoRDHA URB. L.J. 973 (1983) (contending that, rather
than concentrating on stop gap measures to reduce insurance premiums, reform
efforts should be directed toward creating inexpensive recovery and providing
immediate compensation for a greater percentage of those injured by medical
accidents) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice Damage A wards].
12. See infra notes 224-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 33-76 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 95-198 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 199-269 and accompanying text.
22. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note 1, at 118-19.
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reducing malpractice insurance premiums by (1) limiting the size of
damage awards; (2) reducing the number of malpractice cases pro-
ceeding to trial; and (3) reducing the incidence of malpractice. 23
These reforms included (1) requiring that malpractice awards in excess
of some "ceiling" amount be paid in periodic installments throughout
the patient's incapacity;24 (2) limiting the size of awards for non-
economic damages; 25 (3) limiting contingency fees; 26 (4) requiring the
losing party to pay all attorney's fees; 27 (5) limiting the admission
of expert testimony;2 and (6) requiring malpractice plaintiffs to
submit their claims to some alternative forum before proceeding to
trial.29
Attacks on medical malpractice legislation were brought primarily
under state and federal equal protection and due process clauses.3 0
23. Comment, Recent Malpractice Legislation-A First Check-Up, 50 TUL. L.
REv. 655, 667-88 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice Legislation].
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51 (West Supp. 1985).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4204 to
-4205 (West 1985) (repealed 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 70 § 101 (West Supp.
1985) (held unconstitutional, Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 1ll.2d 313,
347 N.E.2d 736 (1976), repealed 1979)); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (Burns
1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(2) (West Supp. 1986); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2825 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-6 (1978); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1981); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 655.23(5) (West 1980).
26. IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1975); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-9.5-5-1 (Burns 1983).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56(1) (West Supp. 1985).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6854(a) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 768.45(2) (West Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (Page 1981).
29. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.535-.536 (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-567 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2603 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1985); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-196 (Supp. 1980) (repealed 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 6803-6814 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (West Supp. 1981) (held
unconstitutional, Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980), repealed 1983);
HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 to -20 (1976 and Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-
1001 to -1013 (1979); IND, CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns 1983); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4901 to -4908 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West
1979 & Supp. 1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 538.010-.080 (Vernon Supp. 1981) (held unconstitutional, State
ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979),
repealed 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-101 to -6-606 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT.
89 44-2840 to -2847 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41A.016-.069 (1985); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:1 to :10 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-14 to -24 (1978);
N.Y. JUD. LAW 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2711.21 (Page 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.301-.606 (Purdon Supp.
1985) (held unconstitutional, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190
(1980)); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to -10 (Supp. 1980) (repealed 1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-101 to -113 (repealed 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02-21
(West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
30. For a discussion of the reasoning employed by courts entertaining challenges
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Opponents of the legislation charged that plaintiffs in medical mal-
practice actions were being forced to bear the burdens imposed by
such legislation when no similar burdens were being imposed on
plaintiffs in other negligence suits.3' They further charged that these
statutes curtailed plaintiffs' rights to judicial resolution of their claims
and, therefore, were in violation of constitutional guarantees of
substantive due process.3 2
A. Standards of Constitutional Analysis
Whether courts sustained the new provisions depended upon which
standard of constitutional scrutiny each court chose. Courts which
have examined medical malpractice legislation have done so under
three standards: strict scrutiny, reasonable relationship, and fair and
substantial relationship.3
To survive analysis under the strict scrutiny standard the challenged
provision had to be a necessary means of achieving a compelling
state interest.34 In the past, courts have applied the strict scrutiny
standard only when the challenged legislation authorized differential
to medical malpractice legislation on these grounds, see infra notes 33-76 and
accompanying text....
31. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 930-31, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980). The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire held various provisions of New Hampshire's
medical malpractice reform act unconstitutional under both the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and part 1, Arts. 12 & 22 of the New
Hampshire Constitution. 120 N.H. at 930-31, 424 A.2d at 830-39. Among the
provisions of the act that the court held invalid were N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-C:7 IV (Supp. 1979), which allowed courts to order periodic payment of
damages, 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8
(Supp. 1979), which established a contingency fee scale for attorneys representing
parties in medical injury actions, 120 N.H. 945, 424 A.2d at 839; and N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 1I (Supp. 1979), which placed a limit of $250,000 on damages
awardable for pain and suffering and other non-economic injuries, 120 N.H. at
943, 424 A.2d at 838.
32. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (2d Dep't
1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977). The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department upheld JUD. LAW
§ 148-a(8), which made unanimous panel findings admissible as evidence, against a
due process challenge that interpreted the provision as an unconstitutional burden
on a malpractice litigant's right to a trial by jury. 55 A.D.2d at 305, 390 N.Y.S.
2d at 123. It was the trial court's view that " 'to anticipate anything less than a
full and complete adoption by the jury of the Panel's recommendation as to liability
is unrealistic and strains credulity.' " 55 A.D.2d at 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 124
(citation omitted).
33. See supra notes 41-76 and accompanying text.
34. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court stated that "any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional right] unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is uncon-
stitutional." Id. at 634 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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treatment of a "suspect" class of people, or when it burdened some
fundamental right."
Under the reasonable relationship standard, the provision need
only be a reasonable means of achieving some end within the state's
police power.36 New York courts employed this standard in analyzing
medical malpractice legislation.37
Finally, in recent years, a few courts have elected to analyze
medical malpractice legislation under the "fair and substantial re-
lationship" test,3 8 which has been used in federal courts exclusively
in sex-bias and illegitimacy cases.3 9 Some provisions examined under
this third test have been upheld, while others have been struck
down.40
B. The Ohio Challenge
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 41 a case involving one of
the earliest challenges to medical malpractice legislation, was decided
35. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96 (1979). The Court stated:
Appellees have not suggested that the statutory distinction between Foreign
Service personnel over age 60 and other federal employees over that age
burdens a suspect group or fundamental interest; and in cases where
these considerations are absent, courts are quite reluctant to overturn
governmental actions on the ground that it denies equal protection of
Id. (footnotes omitted).
36. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The Court required "at a minimum,
that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship t' a legitimate state
purpose." Id. at 766 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 172 (1972)).
37. Kletnieks v. Brookhaven Memorial Ass'n, 53 A.D.2d 169, 175, 385 N.Y.S.2d
575, 579 (2d Dep't 1976); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d
122, 128-30 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d
200 (1977); Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 757-58, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976).
38. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980);
Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 273 Ind. 374, 393, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600-01
(1980).
39. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) ("[ajlthough ... clas-
sifications based on illegitimacy are not subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they nevertheless
are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related
to permissible state interests"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("a classification
[based on the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration] 'must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' ") (quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
40. For a discussion of the cases utilizing the "fair and substantial relationship"
test, see supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
41. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
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by the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. In that case, laws providing
for compulsory arbitration of medical malpractice claims and a
damage limitation of $200,000 were struck down under a strict
scrutiny analysis.42
In its analysis, the court in Simon adopted, in its entirety, the
reasoning of the earlier Ohio case of Graley v. Satayatham .4 The
Graley court invalidated the sections of Ohio's Medical Malpractice
Act limiting general damages, forbidding the reduction of damages
by collateral recovery, and requiring the listing of collateral sources
of recovery in the plaintiff's pleadings. The Graley court stated that
because the challenged statutes confer benefits on the medical mal-
practice defendant unavailable to other defendants in tort cases, as
well as deprive plaintiffs in these cases of benefits available to others,
6'an appropriate governmental interest [must be] suitably furthered
by the differential treatment.' "" The court went on to state that
[tihere obviously is "no compelling governmental interest" unless
it be [sic] argued that any segment of the public in financial
distress [can] be at least partly relieved of financial accountability
for its negligence. To articulate the requirement is to demonstrate
its absurdity, for at one time or another every type of profession
or business undergoes difficult times, and it is not the business
of government to manipulate the laws so as to provide succor to
one class, the medical, by depriving another, the malpracticed
patients, of equal protection mandated by the constitution. 45
The court further acknowledged that the legislation was aimed at
protecting public health by assuring the availability of medical care
through the reduction of malpractice premiums. Even so, the court
stated that the legislation could prove counterproductive "[t]o the
extent that in tort actions of the malpractice type if the medical
profession is less accountable than formerly, relaxation of medical
standards may occur with the public the victim."46
Other cases have upheld malpractice legislation as a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power to protect the health and welfare
of the community. 47 These courts have held that in enacting legislation
42. Id. at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906.
43. 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
44. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837 (citing Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
45. 74 Ohio Op. 2d at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
46. Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 838.
47. See e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173-75 (5th Cir.
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aimed at reducing malpractice premiums, the state took reasonable
steps toward insuring the continued availability of high quality health
care.
41
C. The New York and California Responses
Two New York cases, Comiskey v. Arlen49 and Halpern v. Gozan,50
were among the earliest cases upholding Judiciary Law Section 148-
a51 under the rational relationship test. Relying on Montgomery v.
Daniels,52 the courts in Comiskey and Halpern pointed out that the
strict scrutiny test "could only be applied only where the challenged
law created classifications which impaired some fundamental con-
stitutional rights."" a Such rights did not include the right of unin-
hibited access to the court for the purpose of suing for damages
in a negligence action.54 Thus, the courts in Comiskey and Halpern
chose to examine the New York panel system under a less stringent
rational relationship test which stated:
In the area of economic and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifi-
cations made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. '"55
The court in Comiskey then observed that the panels were created
"due to the urgent necessity to find a reasonable procedure for
1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 585, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (1977); Carter
v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1979);
Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 987-89 (Mass. 1977); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 112-13, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667-68 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski
v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 509, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
48. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
49. 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696,
372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977).
50. 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976).
51. This statute created medical malpractice screening panels. N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 148-a (McKinney 1983). For the complete text of § 148-a, see infra note 144.
52. 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975). In Montgomery,
the court of appeals upheld the legislature's no-fault auto insurance statute against
due process and equal protection challenges brought under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id.
53. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 313, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 129; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 757, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
54. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 313, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 129; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 757, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
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dealing with the crisis situation of increasing medical malpractice
insurance rates." '5 6 The court upheld panels on the grounds that they
bore a rational relationship "to deal[ing] comprehensively with the
critical threat to the health and welfare of the State as a result of
the lack of adequate medical malpractice insurance coverage at
reasonable rates."957
A similar analysis was applied in a recent California case to
statutes authorizing periodic payment of malpractice damage awards
and limiting damage recoveries. In Fein v. Permenate Medical Group,"
the Supreme Court of California began its analysis by recognizing
the existence of a crisis in the health care industry, caused by the
"increasing number of suits against health care providers, . . . in-
creasing settlements and awards in those suits, ... a decrease in
the number of companies willing to provide malpractice insurance,
and skyrocketing costs of such insurance." 5 9 The court went on to
state:
The Legislature could reasonably determine that ... limitation
of awards for non-pecuniary damages and the payment of damages
by periodic installments over the period during which the damages
would be incurred would have the effect of reducing the costs
of insuring health care providers without depriving the injured
party of provision for his needsY°
D. Innovations in New Hampshire and Indiana
Departing somewhat from traditional analysis, two recent cases
evaluated similar malpractice legislation under the "fair and sub-
stantial relationship" test. In Carson v. Maurer,61 the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire invalidated provisions which limited awards for
55. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) discussed at 55 A.D.2d at 314, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 129; 85 Misc. 2d at 757, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748).
56. 55 A.D.2d at 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30.
57. 55 A.D.2d at 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 130 (citing Memorandum of State
Executive Dep't, N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 419 (1975)).
58. 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1981), superseded, 38
Cal. 3d 137, 162, 695 P.2d 665, 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385-86 (on rehearing,
the California court again upheld the $250,000 damage limitation), appeal dismissed,
106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
59. 121 Cal. App. 3d at (opinion omitted), 175 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
60. Id.
61. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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non-economic losses to $250,000,62 empowered the court to order
periodic payment of future damages in excess of $50,000,63 and
imposed a contingent fee scale for attorneys representing parties in
medical injury actions." The court recognized that the United States
Supreme Court had restricted the use of the substantial relationship
test under the federal constitution to cases involving classifications
based on gender and illegitimacy.6 5 The court went on to note,
however, that the application of this standard was not so limited
under its state constitution."
Utilizing this test, the court found that the challenged classi-
fication was not sufficiently based " 'upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion.' ,617 The court further decided that the two damage provisions
invidiously discriminated against medical malpractice victims, as op-
62. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 507-C:7 II (Supp. 1979). The court stated that
the purpose of this statute was to stabilize insurance risks and reduce malpractice
insurance rates by guaranteeing that insurers will not have to pay out damages for
"pain and suffering or other non-economic loss" in excess of $250,000. Carson,
120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
63. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 IV (Supp. 1979). The court deemed this
provision to ensure that claimants with substantial injuries requiring long-term
treatment would have money available to pay for future medical care. Carson, 120
N.H. at 943-44, 424 A.2d at 838.
64. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (Supp. 1979). The court stated that this
provision ensures that plaintiff rather than his attorney, receives the bulk of any
award. Carson, 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838-39.
65. Id. at 831 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (illegitimacy);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (gender)).
66. The court stated:
In interpreting our State constitution, however, we are not confined to
federal constitutional standards and are free to grant individuals more
rights tha[n] [sic] the Federal Constitution requires .... Indeed, we have
applied the "fair and substantial relation" test not only in scrutinizing
gender-based classifications . . . but also in examining economic and
social legislation and ordinances which did not involve distinctions based
upon gender or illegitimacy.
120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831 (citations omitted).
67. Id. (quoting State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163, 304 A.2d 366, 369 (1973)
quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). In discussing
the limitation on damage awards, the court pointed out that because paid out
damage awards constituted but a small portion of the total insurance premium
costs, and because few individuals suffer non-economic damages in excess of
$250,000, the necessary relationship between the goal of rate reduction and the
means chosen to attain it was lacking. 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d 836. In discussing
periodic payments, the court stated that the purpose of the applicable provision
was to eliminate a "bonus element," namely, the payment of portions of the award
no longer needed to compensate the malpractice victim. 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d
at 838. The court was referring to that portion of the provision that allowed courts
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posed to other tort claimants68 and, at the same time, discriminated
against those medical malpractice victims suffering the most serious
injuries. 69 As the court stated, "[i]t is simply unfair and unreasonable
to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry solely
upon those persons who are most severely injured and therefore
most in need of compensation. ' 70 In invalidating the contingent fee
schedule, the court emphasized the tenuous relationship between
limiting attorney's fees and reducing insurance premiums, stating
that "It]here is no 'direct evidence that juries consider attorney's
fees in coming to a verdict . . . . " -7
In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. ,72 the Supreme Court
of Indiana used the same "fair and substantial relationship" test
to uphold provisions placing a ceiling of $500,000 on malpractice
damage awards," limiting contingency fees in malpractice cases, 74
and requiring pre-trial submission of malpractice claims to a mal-
practice panel. 7 Examining the provision under both the state and
federal constitutions, the court held that such measures were rea-
sonably related to preserving the availability of medical malpractice
to terminate periodic payments for non-economic damages, such as pain and suf-
fering, after the plaintiff's death. The court went on to state that regardless of
whether the provision furthered the purpose of reducing premiums, by denying
plaintiff's right to dispose of his property as he pleased, and by limiting periodic
payments to damages in excess of $50,000, the provision discriminated against
health care plaintiffs and unduly burdened the most seriously injured malpractice
victims. Id. For the court's discussion of the provision limiting attorney's contingency
fees, see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
68. 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836-37. The court stated that it is unfair to
limit recoveries for medical malpractice plaintiffs while leaving recoveries for other
tort victims unimpaired. "It is also clear that the cap on damage recovery distin-
guishes ... between malpractice victims and victims of other torts . . . ." Id.
69. Id. The court found that the provision denied equal protection of the law
to the more seriously injured medical malpractice plaintiffs as opposed to those
plaintiffs suffering relatively minor injuries because it precluded "only the most
seriously injured victims of medical negligence from receiving full compensation
for their injuries." 120 N.H. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
70. Id. at 941, 424 A.2d at 837.
71. Id. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839 (quoting Jenkins & Schweinfurth, California's
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. 829, 943 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as Jenkins & Schweinfurth]. The court is
meant that if attorneys receive a smaller portion of each malpractice award, juries
will feel less compelled to grant malpractice plaintiffs such large recoveries. The
court went on to state that "at least one study shows that juries do not include
an assessment of the lawyer's contingency fee in their allotment of damages .... "
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Jenkins & Schweinfurth, supra at 943).
72. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
73. Id. at 397-400, 404 N.E.2d at 600-01.
74. Id. at 401-02, 404 N.E.2d at 602-03.
75. Id. at 386-91, 404 N.E.2d at 596-97.
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insurance and, thus, "to protect[ing] the public interest adversely
being affected by a curtailment of malpractice insurance for health
care providers. "76
III. New York's First Medical Malpractice Reform Effort
In the early 1970's, New York began to experience the effects of
the increase in medical malpractice litigation that was affecting much
of the country. 77 By 1975, private insurers had completely abandoned
the medical malpractice market.78 Since that time, two non-profit
organizations, the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association 79 and
the Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company8 ° have been the
principal insurers of physicians in New York.8'
In response to pressure from physicians, businessmen, and insurers,
Governor Hugh Carey created a special advisory panel to explore
the fundamental causes of the medical malpractice problem. 2 The
76. Id. at 402, 404 N.E.2d at 603. In addition to examining these provisions
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court also
looked at their validity under the Indiana constitution's privileges and immunities
clause and that constitution's prohibition against special legislation. The standard
the court applied under its own constitution was "whether the legislative classification
is based upon substantial distinctions with reference to the subject-matter, or is
manifestly unjust or unreasonable." Id. at 392, 404 N.E.2d at 597 (citing Steup
v. Indiana Hous. Fin. Auth., 273 Ind. 72, 402 N.E.2d 1215 (1980); Phillips v.
Officials of Valparaiso, 233 Ind. 414, 120 N.E.2d 398 (1954)). The court
further stated that under both the federal and state constitutions "the burden was
on the appellants below to negative every conceivable basis which might have
supported the classification." 273 Ind. at 392, 404 N.E.2d at 597, (citing Madden
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940), Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973)). The court found that appellants failed to
satisfy this burden. 273 Ind. at 393, 404 N.E.2d at 597.
77. Malpractice Damage Awards, supra note II, at 973 n.2. One insurer paid the
following totals, which include damage awards and attorney's costs for prior claims,
for the years 1971-75: 1971, $7.1 million; 1972, $11.2 million; 1973, $17.4 million;
1974, $21.7 million; 1975, $27.6 million. Id.
78. NEW YORK MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM COALITION, NEW YORK'S CONTINUING
MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: WHY IT STILL EXISTS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEM, A BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND
MEMORANDUM].
79. The association, also called MMIA, was established by the legislature. See
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5501-515 (McKinney 1985).
80. The Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, otherwise known as
MLMIC, is physician-owned. Malpractice Damage Awards, supra, note 11, at 984.
81. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 6.
82. T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 100 (1978). In addition to
its chairman, William McGill, then president of Columbia University, the panel
was composed of four legislators, two physicians, an attorney, and a hospital
administrator. Id. The panel conducted hearings in the fall of 1975 in Albany,
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panel issued its report in January of 1976, in which it stated:
"Inasmuch as the present tort law liability insurance system for
medical malpractice will eventually break down, and costs will and
have continued to rise to unacceptable levels, fundamental reform
of the present tort law liability insurance system should be under-
taken." 3
In anticipation of the panel's recommendation, the New York
Legislature began its first attempts to check escalating premiums in
1974.84 This first attempt at reform included: (1) creation of medical
malpractice screening panels;8 5 (2) limitation of malpractice actions
based on informed consent to non-emergency situations or to cases
in which a diagnostic procedure invades or disrupts the integrity of
the body;86 (3) reduction of the statute of limitations in malpractice
actions to two and one-half years after accrual of the action 7 and
to ten years for indigent minors and others acting under a disability; 8
and based its report on testimony it received from a cross-section of individuals
interested in and affected by the malpractice crisis. Id.
83. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 6.
84. Malpractice Damage Awards, supra note 11, at 982.
85. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983). For the complete text of this
provision, see supra note 145.
86. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1983). This provision defines
lack of informed consent as:
[T]he failure of the person providing the professional treatment or di-
agnoses to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the rea-
sonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical
practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner
permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
Id.
87. N.Y. Civ. PRuc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1986). This provision states:
An action for medical or dental malpractice must be commenced within
two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of
or last treatment where there is "continuous treatment" for the same
illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or
failure; provided, however, that where the action is based upon the
discovery of a foreign object in the body of the patient, the action may
be commenced within one year of the date of such discovery or of the
date of such discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such
discovery, whichever is earlier. For the purpose of this section the term
"continuous treatment" shall not include examinations undertaken at the
request of the patient for the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of
the patient's condition. For the purpose of this section, the term "foreign
object" shall not include a chemical compound or prosthetic aid or
device.
Id.
88. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 208 (McKinney Supp. 1986). This provision states:
If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because
of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and the
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(4) allowing consideration by the court of payments from collateral
sources of recovery in setting awards; 9 and (5) providing an insurance
pool through the establishment of the aforementioned Medical Mal-
practice Insurance Association.9
Many physicians felt that the above reforms would have no
substantial effect on rising premiums. Their dissatisfaction resulted
in the doctors' strike of 1975.9' Furthermore, the special advisory
panel appointed by the governor to study the malpractice problem
time otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years or more
and expires no later than three years after the disability ceases, or the
person under the disability dies, the time within which the action must
be commenced shall be extended to three years after the disability ceases
or the person under disability dies, whichever event first occurs; if the
time otherwise limited is less than three years, the time shall be extended
by the period of disability. The time within which the action must be
commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years
after the cause of action accrues, except, in any action other than for
medical or dental malpractice, where the person was under a disability
due to infancy. This section shall not apply to an action to recover a
penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape.
Id.
89. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 545 (McKinney Supp. 1986). This provision states:
In any action for medical malpractice where the plaintiff seeks to recover
for the cost of medical care, custodial care or rehabilitation services,
loss of earnings or other economic loss, evidence shall be admissible for
consideration by the court to establish that any such cost or expense
was replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part from any collateral
source such as insurance, (except for life insurance), social security (except
those benefits provided under title XVII of the Social Security Act)
workers' compensation or employee benefit programs, (except such col-
lateral sources entitled by law to liens against any recovery of the plaintiff).
If the court finds that any such cost or expense was replaced or indem-
nified from any collateral source, it shall reduce the amount of the award
by such finding, minus an amount equal to the premiums paid by the
plaintiff for such benefits for the two-year period immediately preceding
the accrual of such action.Id.
90. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5501-15 (McKinney 1985). The statute defines medical
malpractice insurance as "insurance against legal liability of the insured, and against
loss, damage, or expense incident to a claim of such liability arising out of the
death or injury of any person due to medical or hospital malpractice by any licensed
physician or hospital." Id.
91. Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 755, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976). Though traditionally opposed to strikes by physicians,
the American Medical Association issued the following statement in support of a
strike by interns and residents at twenty-three New York City hospitals, which took
place in March of 1975: "The malpractice problem is so critical that if the legislatures
do not respond to remedial legislation we are absolutely going to have utter chaos
in this country because for the first time in history you are going to see massive
walkouts and withholding of services by American doctors." MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE, supra note 1 at 36 (quoting Altman, Malpractice Crises Overshadow
Agenda as A.M.A. Session Opens, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1975, at 44, col. 2).
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implied its dissatisfaction with these reforms by stating as its first
recommendation that "the overriding concern should be to create
a system of compensation for adverse medical outcomes resulting
from medical treatment, whether or not caused by negligence.''92
Consistent with the most pessimistic predictions, the number of
suits against health care providers, and the size of the malpractice
insurance premiums continued to rise. 93 As a result, Albany launched
its second attempt to deal with the medical malpractice problem. 94
IV. The Cuomo Bill
The Bill's stated purpose is to promote "the continued availability
and affordability of quality health services in New York state" 95 by
reducing the cost of malpractice insurance, which "discourage[s]
physicians ... from initiating and continuing their practice in New
York and contribute[s] to the rising cost of health care as premium
costs are passed along to the health care consumer."96 Like its
predecessors in other states, the Bill purports to achieve this goal
in three ways: (1) by adjusting malpractice awards; 97 (2) by reducing
the number of cases that proceed to trial; 98 and (3) by reducing the
incidence of malpractice.9
A. Adjusting Awards
The Bill makes two major changes in the laws governing mal-
practice awards. First, section 9 provides for periodic payment of
future damages.' °° Second, section 15 sets out a new schedule for
determining attorney's contingency fees.' 10
1. Periodic Payment of Awards
Section 9 of the Bill provides that awards be divided into two
92. SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATURE, RECOMMENDATION No. 1 (1976).
93. For statistics on the increase in the number of suits brought against physicians
for 1975-1985, see supra note 3. For statistics on the rise in insurance premiums
for this same period, see supra note 6.
94. For a discussion of the major legislative changes that comprised this second
wave of reform, see infra notes 95-197 and accompanying text.
95. 1985 N.Y. LAWS ch. 294 § 1.
96. Id.
97. For a discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 102-15.
98. For a discussion of these provisions see infra notes 116-88 and accompanying
text.
99. For a discussion of these provisions see infra notes 189-98 and accompanying
text.
100. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW art. 50-a (McKinney Supp. 1986).
101. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a(2)-(4) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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parts. The first, or "lump sum" part, is available to the plaintiff
immediately after the entry of judgment. It includes compensation
for damages incurred before the amount of the award is determined-
past damages-as well as for damages, up to $250,000, incurred
after the award is announced-future damages. 0 2 It also includes
litigation expenses and "that portion of the attorney's fees related
to future damages for which, pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
art. 50-a, the claimant is entitled to a lump sum payment."' °3 The
second part of the award, or all future damages in excess of $250,000,
is paid over that period of time "determined by the trier of fact"
with the added proviso that that portion of the award attributable
to pain and suffering will be paid over ten years or some other
period of time "determined by the trier of fact, whichever is less."0 4
Section 9 provides a number of advantages. The first of these
is that periodic payments of future damages will prevent successful
plaintiffs from squandering their awards.' °5 In addition, plaintiffs
will receive the entire amount of damages in periodic tax-free in-
stallments. °0 This section also benefits defendants in that the plain-
tiff's death will relieve the defendant from having to make any
further payments towards plaintiff's future health care and his non-
economic expenses. 07 Finally, the provision will reduce the overall
cost of judgment by allowing the insurer to retain and invest future
damages before installments come due.108
102. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 5031(b) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
103. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5031(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
104. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 5031(e) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
105. See generally Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417. 1453.
Recoveries in medical malpractice actions often include awards for future
damages, e.g., anticipated costs of future health care and loss of earning
capacity. Because of the lack of precision in estimating life expectancy
and other contingencies which affect the amount of such damages, this
portion of the recovery is highly speculative .... In addition, there is
no assurance that the award will not be squandered by the plaintiff long
before his financial needs are met. If such an award is improvidently
spent by the imprudent plaintiff, he is likely to become a ward of the
state for his economic and medical necessities, resulting in a double cost
to society for his injuries.
Id. (emphasis in original).
106. 1985 GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM 4 [hereinafter cited as PRO-
GRAM BILL MEMORANDUM].
107. Id. at 5.




Section 15 of the Bill sets out the following mandatory schedule
for payment of contingency fees:
30% of the first $250,000 of the sum recovered;
25% of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered;
20% of the next $500,000 of the sum recovered;
15% of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered;
1001o of any amount over $1,250,000 of the sum recovered. 1°9
Futhermore, plaintiff's attorney can make application to the court
for greater compensation than that provided in the schedule if he
believes in good faith that because of extraordinary circumstances,
the schedule will not compensate him sufficiently. 01
Previously, the law allowed plaintiff and his attorney to choose
between a graduated schedule like the above and a straight one-third
of any recovery."' The old schedule was labelled "inadequate and
outdated" by Governor Cuomo 2 while physicians complained that
it unduly enriched attorneys at the expense of injured plaintiffs." 3
Section 15 of the Bill also ensures that a larger percentage of
the award will compensate the plaintiff rather than his attorney." 4
Theoretically at least, it should also encourage juries to lower the
amounts of awards because the jury will know that a larger percentage
109. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
110. N.Y. JurD. LAW § 474-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
Ill. Former N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a(2) created the following contingent fee
schedule for medical malpractice actions: 50 percent of the first $1,000 of the sum
recovered; 25 percent of the next $2,000 of the sum recovered; 20 percent of the
next $22,000 of the sum recovered; 15 percent of the next $250,000 of the sum
recovered; 10 percent of any amount over $1,250,000 of the sum recovered; or
"[a] percentage not exceeding thirty-three and one third percent of the sum recovered,
if the initial contractual arrangement between the client and the attorney so provides,
in which event the procedure hereinafter provided for making application for
additional compensation because of extraordinary circumstances shall not apply."
N.Y. JtD. LAW § 474-a(2) (McKinney 1983).
112. PROGRAM BIL MEMORANDUM, supra note 106 at 5.
113. See, e.g., Strausz, How to Drive Doctors Out, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1985,
A2, col. 2. (Although "the malpractice lawyer's view that 'doctors must pay for
their mistakes' may have a touch of altruism, mostly this stance reflects legally
sanctioned greed for the vast profits earned under the contingent fee system." Id.
at col. 3).
114. See PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 5 (stating that the
Bill will "establish maximum levels for contingency fees in medical malpractice
actions to assure that the injured party will receive a sufficient share of the judgment
and to target insurance premium dollars primarily to the plaintiff's compensation")
Id.
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of the award will go to the plaintiff than would have before the
Bill became law." 5
B. Reducing the Number of Cases Proceeding to Trial
Besides making changes in the laws governing malpractice awards,
the Bill seeks to reduce the number of cases proceeding to trial by
eliminating "frivolous" suits." 6 It attempts to do this by authorizing
the court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an
action which the court later determines to be frivolous," 7 by sub-
jecting the qualifications of each side's expert witnesses to discov-
ery;" 8 and by providing for a new study of the panel system." 9
1. Awarding Attorney's Fees in the Event of a Frivolous Claim
Section 10 of the Bill provides that the successful party in a
medical malpractice action may recover attorney's fees if his opponent
commences or continues a frivolous claim, defense, or counterclaim.'20
Such fees will be awarded at the discretion of the court if it finds
that
(i) the action, claim, counterclaim, defense or cross claim was
commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely to delay or
prolong the resolution of the litigation or to harrass or maliciously
injure another; (ii) the action, claim, counterclaim, defense or
115. Under the current system, the largest portion of each premium dollar is
consumed by the legal profession. One commentator estimated that of each premium
dollar, thirty-one cents goes to insurance sales, administration and investigating
costs, forty cents goes to defense lawyer's fees, and twenty-nine cents compensates
the injured plaintiff. Yuncker, The Malpractice Dispute: Doctors & Insurance, N.Y.
Post, Jan. 11, 1975, at 25, col. 1. Under previous law, one-half to one-third of
that twenty-nine cents went to plaintiff's attorney. See supra note 11; see also
Note, Rx For New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. L.J. & Soc.
PROBS. 466, 480 (1975) ("[p]resently, the lion's share of the premium dollar goes
to the legal community")[hereinafter cited as Medical Malpractice Crisis]; O'Connell,
An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance For Many
Kinds of Injuries, 60 MnqN. L. REv. 501, 507 n.17 (1976) ("lilt is readily apparent,
then, that the amount of claims and judgments paid represent only a portion of
the costs generated by malpractice actions. Furthermore, the lion's share of the
expense goes to the legal community").
116. PROGRAm BL MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 8(d).
117. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1986). See infra notes
120-29 and accompanying text.
118. N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 3101(d) (McKinney Supp. 1986). See infra notes
130-44 and accompanying text.
119. 1985 N.Y. LAWS ch. 294 §§ 14, 22. See infra notes 146-88 and accompanying
text.
120. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 8303-a(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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cross claim was commenced or continued in bad faith without
any reasonable basis in law or fact and could not be supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.'
While the "American rule" states that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, litigants should pay their own attorney's fees,,2"
both courts and legislatures have created numerous exceptions to
this doctrine. 3
The New York Court of Appeals has held that New York courts
have no power to award attorney's fees unless they are permitted
by contract or statute.' 24 Several New York statutes contain such
a provision. For example, attorney's fees are available in New York
in landlord/tenant disputes,'25 debtor/creditor disputes, 26 domestic
disputes,' 27 and class actions. 28 A recognized objective of such statutes
is the elimination of "frivolous" litigation. 2 9 Thus, a provision
allowing courts to award attorney's fees in medical malpractice cases
would be consistent with prevailing legal trends.
2. Expert Witnesses
Section 4(d)(1) of the Bill requires that prior to trial, each party
shall identify for his opponent, upon request, the subject matter as
121. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 8303-a(c)(i)(ii) (McKinney 1986).
122. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("in
the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorney's fee from the loser").
123. Woods, For Every Weapon a Counterweapon: The Revival of Rule 68, 14
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 283, 305-06 (1986).
124. Green v. Potter, 51 N.Y.2d 627, 629-30, 416 N.E.2d 1040, 1032, 435 N.Y.S.
2d 695, 696-97 (1980) (holding that in absence of statutory authority counsel's fees
are not compensable and there is no statutory authority for an award of counsel's
fees to petitioner in conservatorship proceeding brought pursuant to Article 77 of
Mental Hygiene Act). See also Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen & Lawler, P.C. v. Easter,
98 A.D.2d 953, 470 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (4th Dep't 1983) (denying award of attorney's
fees in action based on promissory note); Goresen v. Gallagher, 97 A.D.2d 626,
628, 468 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943 (3d Dep't 1983) (denying attorney's fee award in
summary proceeding to recover possession of marital residence); Drake v. Drake,
94 A.D.2d 768, 462 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (2d Dep't 1983) (award of attorney's
fees in action seeking modification of separation agreement that had not been
incorporated in judgment of separation).
125. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1986).
126. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276-a (McKinney 1945).
127. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 237 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
128. N.Y. Crv. PrAc. LAW § 909 (McKinney 1976).
129. For example, a taxpayer who is adjudged to have brought a frivolous suit
can be fined up to $5,000. I.R.C. § 6673. Furthermore, the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility provides for disciplinary sanctions against attorneys who
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well as the substance of the facts and opinions on which his expert
witnesses shall testify, the expert's qualifications and a summary of
the grounds for the expert's opinion. 30 The provision seeks to weed
out frivolous claims and defenses by improving each party's ability
to expose, through cross examination, incompetent or dishonest
''experts."13
'
Unlike expert witnesses in most tort cases, the expert witness in
medical malpractice litigation has assumed a pre-eminent position.'
Traditionally, New York courts regard experts with suspicion as an
unfair influence on the finder of fact..' Indeed, in contrast to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, New York courts will admit expert
testimony only when it is necessary to enable the jury to render a
verdict. 3 4 In medical malpractice cases, however, courts are generally
in agreement that unless the plaintiff can produce expert testimony
to demonstrate both what the appropriate standard of care would
be and that the doctor's negligence caused the patient's injury, a
verdict of nonsuit must be rendered.' Furthermore, in cases in
"[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law
. .. [or cannot] be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(2)
(McKinney 1975).
130. 1985 N.Y. LAWS ch. 294 § 4(d)(l).
131. See PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 8(b).
132. For a discussion of the status of the expert witness in medical malpractice
cases, see infra notes 135-37.
133. See, e.g., Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 140, 148, 351
N.E.2d 735, 740, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92 (1976) ("[albsent such inability or incom-
petence [of juries to comprehend the issues, evaluate the evidence, and to estimate
the likely outcome of a specific action] the opinions of experts, which intrude on
the province of the jury to draw inferences and conclusions, are both unnecessary
and improper").
134. See Kulak, 40 N.Y.2d at 148, 351 N.E.2d at 740, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
FED. R. Evm. 702.
135. See, e.g., Fileccia v. Massapequa Gen. Hosp., 99 A.D.2d 796, 472 N.Y.S.2d
127, 128 (2d Dep't) (defendant's motion for summary judgment granted in absence
of expert evidence that he negligently read and interpreted plaintiff's x-ray), aff'd,
63 N.Y.2d 639, 468 N.E.2d 702, 479 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1984); Gibson v. D'Amico,
97 A.D.2d 905, 906, 470 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (3d Dep't 1983) (complaint dismissed
for plaintiff's failure to present expert evidence of standard of care in the area
or that defendant negligently examined plaintiff's knee following auto accident);
Pan v. Coburn, 95 A.D.2d 670, 463 N.Y.S.2d 223 (lst Dep't 1983) (complaint
dismissed for plaintiff's failure to present any medical evidence that standard of
care was departed from in defendant's performance of plastic surgery on plaintiff).
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which the plaintiff bases his action solely on the lack of informed
consent, New York law requires that he support his charge with
expert testimony. 3 6 The only exceptions to the requirement of expert
opinion in medical malpractice cases occur when the case presents
no issues that are beyond a juror's understanding or when it does
not involve matters of science or art requiring a degree of knowledge
or skill not ordinarily possessed by the average person. 
37
Although there are no set standards governing the admissibility
of his testimony, an expert witness in a medical malpractice case
must overcome two hurdles before he can influence, in any way,
the outcome of a trial.'38 First, his credentials must convince the
judge, who has almost unlimited discretion in deciding who will be
admitted as an expert witness, that he is qualified to testify. 39 Second,
he must convince the jury that his testimony merits some weight in
their deliberations.14'
136. Civil Practice Rule 4401 provides that "[a] motion for judgment at the end
of the plaintiff's case must be granted as to any cause of action for medical
malpractice based solely on lack of informed consent if the plaintiff has failed to
adduce expert testimony in support of the alleged qualitative insufficiency of the
consent." N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. R. 4401 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
137. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 380, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d
65, 67 (1960) (assault by defendant psychiatrist on plaintiff).
138. Despite the absence of standards, a number of criteria have been established
to guide the attorney in finding the most effective way to establish the expert's
credibility. See 9 AM. JUR. P.O.F. Physicians and Surgeons 247 (1961), which
states that a party introducing expert medical testimony should use the following
checklist to qualify the witness as a medical expert: (1) is the witness licensed to
practice; (2) date license was obtained; (3) educational qualifications, that is, does
the witness have a medical degree from an accredited medical school, internship
or residency program; (4) is the witness certified by any specialty boards; (5) does
the witness belong to any professional organizations; (6) is the witness a recipient
of any honors or awards; (7) teaching experience; (8) authorships and years of
experience; (9) hospital affiliations; (10) number of patients treated concerning the
problem giving rise to the litigation; (11) is the witness familiar with the injury
complained of. Id.
139. "The prevailing rule is that the question of the qualification of a witness
to testify as an expert is for determination, in his reasonable discretion, by the
trial court, which discretion, when exercised, is not open to review unless in deciding
the question the trial court has made a serious mistake or committed an error of
law or has abused his discretion." Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N.Y.
389, 398-99, 34 N.E.2d 367, 372 (1941).
140. See Comment, Medical Malpractice-The Necessity of Expert Testimony
and the Use of a General Physician as an Expert Witness in a Malpractice Action
Against a Specialist, 10 OHio N.U.L. Rv. 37, 53 (1983) ("a party attempting to
introduce an expert witness who lacks certain basic educational requirements will
find it difficult to persuade the jury in his direction") [hereinafter cited as Expert
Witness].
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Specifying definite standards which the expert must meet before
the court will admit his testimony could prevent meritorious claims
from reaching the courtroom. The standards could make it too
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain the expert witnesses that are almost
always necessary.' 4' Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
invalidated a statute stating that a witness is not competent to give
expert testimony in a medical malpractice action unless "the court
finds that the witness was competent and duly qualified to render
or supervise equivalent care to that which is alleged to have caused
the injury at the time that such care was rendered.' ' ' 42 This provision
was invalidated by New Hampshire's highest court on the grounds
that it "places too burdensome a restriction on medical malpractice
claimants who require expert testimony to prove their cause of
action. "' 43 Thus, the Bill's "experts" provision attempts to strike
a balance between weeding out frivolous suits and keeping the courts
open to meritorious claims by facilitating effective cross examination,
thus limiting the influence of the unqualified or dishonest expert.'"
3. Malpractice Screening Panels
Before passage of the Bill, Section 148-a of the Judiciary Law' 45
141. See Dolan v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d 279, 285, 396 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1979) (court
stated "in order to testify as an expert on the standard of care in a given school
of medicine, the witness must be licensed therein"). See Expert Witness, supra
note 140, at 54. This Comment concluded that the stringent standard set forth in
the Galuzzo court's holding "could prevent parties from using an otherwise qualified
physician, such as an unlicensed medical school professor, from testifying as a
medical expert." Id.
142. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 935, 934, 424 A.2d 825, 832 (1980) (citing
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:3 I (Supp. 1979)).
143. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 934-35, 424 A.2d at 832. The Carson court
had no objection to requiring that an expert witness be qualified to render or
supervise equivalent care to that alleged to have caused the injury. Id. The court
did object, however, to requiring that the witness be so qualified at the time such
care was rendered. Id. (The section of the statute that the court objected to has
yet to be amended by the New Hampshire legislature). See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-C:3 1 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
144. See Expert Witness, supra note 140, at 71-72.
145. § 148-a of the Judiciary Law provides:
2.(a) A list of doctors regularly admitted to practice medicine in the
state of New York shall be prepared by each presiding justice of the
appellate division with the assistance of the Medical Society of the State
of New York, a county medical society and/or the New York Academy
of Medicine. Said list shall be divided into lists of doctors according to
the particular specialty of each. (b) The presiding justice shall prepare
a list of attorneys with trial experience, not confined, however, to the
field of medical malpractice. (c) Names of doctors and attorneys may
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required each Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court to establish, within its judicial department, medical malpractice
be added to or taken off the list at any time by the presiding justice
in his discretion. (d) Any party prior to the date set for the hearing
may file a written objection to the designation of a doctor or attorney
which objection shall be decided by the justice presiding as a member
of the panel. 3.(a) The rules of the appellate division shall provide that
prior to the date set for hearing the parties shall submit to the court
all written material, including pleadings, bill of particulars, medical and
hospital reports (or authorization to obtain the same), said written material
to be submitted in triplicate except as to hospital records and X-rays,
and that these materials shall be made available to any panel member
desiring to see the same in advance of the hearing. (b) The rules of the
appellate division shall provide that the Medical Society of the State of
New York, a county medical society and/or the New York Academy of
Medicine shall review the said submitted material and designate the medical
specialty involved and notify the court as to such designation. 4. The
hearing shall be informal and without a stenographic record. Except as
otherwise provided in this section, no statement or expression of opinion
made in the course of the hearing shall be admissible in evidence either
as an admission or otherwise in any trial of the action. The justice
presiding at the hearing shall not preside at the trial. No other panel
member shall participate in the trial either as counsel or witness except
as otherwise provided herein. 5. All parties shall be represented at the
hearing by counsel authorized to act for their respective clients. If au-
thority is not conferred, the plaintiff and a representative of the carrier
so authorized must attend. Failing an appearance, the justice presiding
may order an inquest, strike the case from the calendar, or make such
direction as justice requires. 6. The panel may request an additional
doctor having particular expertise in the specialty involved to assist it in
the determination of the claim. Such doctor shall make a report to the
panel. The panel shall determine the fee and expenses to be paid to such
doctor and the parties to the hearing shall share equally in such fee and
expense. The doctor may be called at a subsequent trial as a witness by
any of the parties. The party calling such witness shall pay all reasonable
fees and expenses of the doctor. 7. Following presentation and discussion
between the panel and counsel, if any disposition is arrived at, either
as to the whole case or any part thereof, an appropriate order shall be
entered. If the justice presiding deems a further hearing necessary or
desirable, he shall fix a date for the same. If no disposition is arrived
at the case shall be remanded to its regular place on the calendar. 8.
If the three members of the panel concur as to the question of liability,
a formal written recommendation concerning such question of liability
shall be signed by the panel members and forwarded to all parties. In
such event, the recommendation shall be admissible in evidence at any
subsequent trial upon the request of any party to the action. The rec-
ommendation shall not be binding upon the jury or, in a case tried
without a jury, upon the trial court, but shall be accorded such weight
as the jury or the trial court chooses to ascribe to it. If the recommendation
is read to the jury or by the trial court, the doctor member or the
attorney member of the panel, or both of them, may be called as a
witness by any party with reference to the recommendation of the panel
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screening panels consisting of a doctor, a lawyer, and a judge.'4 6
The panel, after reviewing a medical malpractice case, either rendered
a unanimous opinion of malpractice, no malpractice, or, in the event
of disagreement, no opinion.' 47 If the panel rendered a unanimous
opinion, the party in whose favor the panel decided could use the
opinion as evidence if the case went to trial. 148 In such cases, the
opposing party was entitled to cross-examine either the doctor or
the attorney on the panel as to the basis of the panel's decision.' 49
The legislature's purpose in creating panels was to reduce the
number of cases proceeding to trial by: (1) weeding out frivolous
suits; and (2) encouraging pre-trial settlement of meritorious claims.
The legislature also hoped that panels would help to reduce the size
of awards. 50 Panels have had limited success in achieving these
goals. There is as yet no evidence that panels have had any success
in weeding out frivolous claims."' When the legislature created
panels, it hoped that they would result in settlement at or immediately
after the panel hearing. Only 4.3 percent of the cases that go to
panel are settled in this manner. 5 2 Sixty-eight percent of the cases
receiving a unanimous panel verdict are eventually settled, but there
is no evidence that settlement resulted because of a panel hearing." 3
However, panels do successfully serve to apprise the parties of the
strengths and weaknesses of their claims. 5 4
only. The party calling such witness or witnesses shall pay their reasonable
fees and expenses.
146. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(l), (2) (McKinney 1983).
147. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(7), (8) (McKinney 1983).
148. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(8) (McKinney 1983).
149. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(8) (McKinney 1983).
150. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Malpractice Panels to the
Chief Administrative Judge on the Operation of Medical Malpractice Panels in
New York State 1 (June 1979) (Preliminary Analysis) [hereinafter cited as Malprac-
tice Panels Committee (Preliminary Analysis)].
151. In its final report, the committee stated that in the years studied, 68 percent
of the cases going to panel were eventually settled. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Medical Malpractice Panels to the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of
New York on the Operation of Medical Malpractice Panels 161 (March 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Malpractice Panels Committee (Final Report)]. However, the
committee made no attempt, in either its preliminary or final report, to isolate the
number of meritless cases abandoned because of an adverse panel verdict.
152. Malpractice Panel Committee (Final Report), supra note 151, at 163-64.
153. Id. at 161-62.
154. Id. at 164. In its 1980 final report the committee stated that "other tort
cases for the period of January 1976-June 1978 were 'disposed of' before trial
at a rate of 83.5 percent." Id. at 161. The court concluded from these statistics
that "an aggressive pre-trial conference conducted by the court in the ordinary
course of its business will produce a greater rate of settlements than will a court
encumbered by the additional layer of medical malpractice panel procedure." Id.
at 162.
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Unfortunately, unanimous panel opinions of malpractice often
strengthen the plaintiff's determination to proceed to trial in hopes
of obtaining the largest award possible.'55 Likewise, where a unan-
imous finding of no malpractice results, defendants are rarely willing
to settle. 5 6 In addition, panel settlements tend to be for higher
awards than settlements that are reached subsequent to the court's
ordinary pre-trial activity. 7 Thus, overall, panels have done little
to reduce either the number of claims proceeding to trial, or the
size of malpractice settlements.'58
Thus far, panels have survived constitutional attack in New
York.'5 9 However, recent judicial decisions, coupled with some un-
foreseen consequences of the practical operation of panels, have
revived doubts about their constitutional validity. 60
155. Id. at 163.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 165.
158. Id.
159. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1976),
aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977); Halpern v. Gozan,
85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976). N.Y. JUD. LAW§ 148-a (McKinney 1983) provides that if the three members of a panel concur that
malpractice does or does not exist, their finding should be admissible at trial,
although it shall not be binding on the jury. Id. In Comiskey and Halpern, it was
claimed that this section violates due process by denying a right of access to the
court. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 312, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 128; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 757, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The courts found that the right to redress a grievance
in a court of law merited constitutional protection only where the right sought to
be protected was a right recognized as carrying a preferred status in a constitutional
sense. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 313, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 129 (citing Montgomery v.
Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 60, 340 N.E.2d 444, 445, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 17 (1975));
Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d at 758, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The right to non-negligent
medical treatment does not carry such a preferred status. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d
at 314-15, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 130; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at
749. The courts also rejected the equal protection challenge because the provision
was reasonably related to "deal[ing] comprehensively with the critical threat to the
health and welfare of the State as a result of the lack of adequate medical malpractice
insurance coverage at reasonable rates." Memorandum of State Executive Dep't,
1975 N.Y. Legis. Ann., 419; accord Kletnieks v. Brookhaven Memorial Ass'n., 53
A.D.2d 169, 172-73, 385 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579-80 (2d Dep't 1976); Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d
at 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
160. See generally Comment, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: A Judicial
Analysis of Their Practical Effect, 42 U. PrrT. L. REv. 939 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Screening Panels]. This Comment traces the judical responses to panels
in various states. The Comment demonstrates that initially, constitutional challenges
to panels often resulted in their being declared invalid under a strict scrutiny
analysis. Id. at 950-51. The Comment further states that this trend later reversed
itself when courts began employing more lenient constitutional standards. Id. at
951. The Comment concludes that the two-tier analysis of panels-employed by
the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and Florida, in which courts examine both
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Panels have been constitutionally challenged on five grounds.' 6'
Opponents of panels have charged that they violate: (1) the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; 62 (2) the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment; 63 (3) the separation of powers
doctrine of the applicable state constitution;164 (4) the right to a trial
by jury; 65 and (5) the right of access to the courts as guaranteed
theoretical and practical problems that panels cause-necessitates reform of panels
if they are not to become an extinct bureaucratic device. Id. at 959.
161. For a discussion of the various constitutional challenges leveled at panels,
see infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583, 570 P.2d 744, 751
(1977) ("[p]etitioner asserts the classification is arbitrary and unreasonable in that
the treatment accorded to medical malpractice plaintiffs is different from tort
plaintiffs generally."); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
167, 355 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1976) ("[The panel provision] confer[s] benefits on the
medical malpractice defendent unavailable to other defendants in tort cases."). The
court in Simon applied the same equal protection analysis to panels that the court
applied to damage limitations in Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343
N.E.2d 832 (1976), stating:
Although not presented as an issue in Graley, the compulsory arbitration
requirements of R.C. Section 2711.21 discriminate against medical mal-
practice claimants in the same fashion as do the damages and pleadings
limitations and requirements which were addressed by Graley. In this
respect, the arbitration provisions suffer from the equal protection in-
firmities as identified in Graley, with respect to damages and pleadings
under the Medical Malpractice Act.
3 Ohio Op. 3d at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906-07. For a discussion of the Graley court's
equal protection analysis, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Comisky, 55 A.D.2d at 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 128; Halpern, 85
Misc. 2d at 758, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The courts in Comiskey and Halpern applied
the same due process analysis as the court of appeals did in Montgomery v. Daniels,
38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975). The statute in Montgomery,
like the statute in Comiskey and Halpern, allegedly denied the substantive right
of access to the courts. The standard applied by the Montgomery court, and adopted
by the courts in Comiskey and Halpern, to determine if a statute meets the
requirements of substantive due process is whether the regulation "is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community .... .
Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 54, 340 N.E.2d at 451, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (citing
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937)).
164. See, e.g., Eastin, 116 Ariz. at 582, 570 P.2d at 750. Petitioners in Eastin
asserted that the provision which empowered the medical liability review panel to
conduct a hearing and find either for the plaintiff or for the defendant, invaded
the judicial function of the Arizona courts as enunciated in the Arizona Constitution.
Id.
165. See, e.g., Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 124. The party
attacking the constitutional validity of panels asserted that to allow the panel's
recommendations to be introduced into evidence would nullify plaintiff's consti-
tutional right to a meaningful jury trial. Id. The court disagreed with the trial
court's finding that "to anticipate anything less than a full and complete adoption
by the jury of the Panel's recommendation as to liability is unrealistic and strains
credulity." Id. See also Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (court
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by the applicable state constitution.1
Challenges to panels as violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment have emphasized
the potential burdens that panels place on medical malpractice plain-
tiffs and their attorneys. Requiring medical malpractice plaintiffs to
submit their claims to a panel prior to trial impedes plaintiffs'
substantive right to judicial determination of their claims by imposing
additional costs and delays. 67 Furthermore, these burdens are not
imposed on any other tort claimants.1'6 Panels which have survived
these attacks have done so by passing the rational basis test as a
reasonable means for achieving a legitimate state end. 169
In Arizona, the panel concept also survived attack under the
separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Arizona state con-
stitution. In Eastin v. Broomfield,'70 petitioners alleged that em-
powering a medical liability review panel to conduct a hearing and
find in favor of either plaintiff or defendant invaded the judicial
function of the Arizona courts, as defined by the Arizona consti-
tution. 7' The court stated that panels do not enter judgment against
either party. Rather, as in New York, "the panel's finding is intended
to encourage settlements and may be introduced into evidence at
any subsequent trial.' 72 Thus, the panel's actions are, at most,
advisory.'7 Because the court defined the judicial power as the power
to "decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect,' 1 74
panels did not infringe upon the judicial power of the court.' 71
asked: "Would not the impact of the recommendation be so overpowering as to
remove de facto the essential elements of fairness and openmindedness which are
so crucial to the total fabric of our jury system, thereby infecting it with prejudicial
taint?").
166. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979), in which the court stated that "[tihe determinative
challenge to Chapter 538 is that it imposes a procedure as a precondition to access
to the courts. It is contended that it violates Mo. Const. Art. I § 14 which provides
that 'the courts of justice shall be open to every person .... ' ").
167. See, e.g., Simon, 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 168, 355 N.E2d at 907.
168. Eastin, 116 Ariz. at 583, 570 P.2d at 752; Simon, 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 166-
67, 355 N.E.2d at 906-07.
169. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
170. 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
171. Arizona Constitution, Art. VI, § I, states:
The judicial power shall be in an integrated judicial department consisting
of a Supreme Court, such intermediate appellate courts as may be provided
by law, a superior court, such courts inferior to the Superior Court as
may be provided by law, and justice courts.
Id.
172. 116 Ariz. at 582, 570 P.2d at 750.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Stuart v. Norviel, 26 Ariz. 493, 501, 226 P. 908, 910 (1926)).
175. 116 Ariz. at 582, 570 P.2d at 750.
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Plaintiffs in two New York cases argued that panels restrict the
right to a trial by jury, asserting that the decisions of panels unduly
influence juries, thus depriving litigants of their right to an unbiased
jury determination of their cause.' 76 Both courts rejected this ar-
gument on the grounds that counsel has the right to cross-examine
doctor and attorney panelists as to the basis of their opinion,' 77
panel decisions are not binding,' and juries are traditionally too
jealous of their independence to allow panels to unduly influence
their determinations. 79
Courts have also held that requiring parties to go to panel before
going to trial does not by itself impermissibly restrict their right of
access to the courts.'8 0 However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held that when delays of up to four years occur from the time
suit is brought to the time a panel finally convenes, the practical
176. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 309, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 126; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49.
177. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 309, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 126; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49.
178. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 309, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 126; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
179. Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 307, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 125; Halpern, 85 Misc. 2d
at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49. The court in Halpern stated:
Historically, jurors for the most part have proven their independence.
They guard their roles with a unique jealousy. They accept with obvious
pride the admonitions of the trial court that they are the "sole judges
of the facts." They show their independence and resentment when the
"province that is theirs" is threatened by suggestion, device or artifice.
While they sit in judgment of their peers, they rise to heights of great
importance during this brief period of their civic lives-a posture brought
about by the major determinations they are asked to make and by the
continuous deference and solicitous manner of the advocates who seek
their favor.
Id.
180. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 120, 394 A.2d
932, 939 (1978). The court was satisfied that any theoretical burden imposed by
panel legislation upon a malpractice victim's right to a trial by jury "is counter-
balanced by the substantial advantages provided to him or her under the Act."
Id. The court stated: "Rather than imposing a burden, this legislation is designed
to afford the plaintiff a swifter adjudication of his claim, at a minimal cost . . ."
Id. at 119-20, 394 A.2d at 939. In Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807-08
(Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring), the court stated:
It troubles me that persons who seek to bring malpractice lawsuits must
be put to the expense of two full trials on their claim, assuming the
medical defendant chooses to put plaintiff to her proof before the panel.
Obviously, this procedure favors the medical defendant over a certain
category of claimants who have limited resources. The only reciprocal
benefit given plaintiffs under the statute is the ability to have the mediation
panel's decision admitted into evidence at the later trial, a benefit which
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operation of panels does impermissibly restrict tis right of access."'1
Similar delays are occurring in certain New York counties."8 ' Thus,
panels may be open to renewed constitutional attack." 3
Section 14 of the Bill eliminates medical malpractice screening
panels in the Fifth Judicial Department and in Suffolk County.
8 4
In addition, section 22 requires the chief administrator of the courts
to conduct a study comparing the disposition of medical malpractice
actions in these two areas with those in the seventh judicial district
and in Nassau County.8 5 In 1988, the chief administrator must
prepare a report of his findings for the governor, the legislature,
and the chief judge of the court of appeals. 18 6 The report will compare
actions brought in these areas according to numbers of actions
brought, speed of disposition, and the impact of panels on the
adjudication of each action. 1 7
Sections 14 and 22 of the Bill were enacted to enable the legislature
to make an accurate determination of whether, and to what degree,
panels are responsible for the unreasonable delays in resolving cases.
In addition, these provisions should allow the legislature to compare
is only valuable if the plaintiff prevails before the mediation panel and
in any event is fully equated to the reciprocal evidentiary right given to
the defendant. While I find the inequity in this procedure harsh to a
large and undefined class of litigants, I cannot in good conscience in-
validate the statute on that basis. A disparity of resources has always
been an imbalance in litigation which the courts are relatively powerless
to adjust.
335 So. 2d at 807-08, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
181. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980). The court
found that the panels were incapable of providing the prompt adjudication of
medical malpractice claims which was the goal of the act. Id. In support of this
finding, the court quoted statistics which revealed that delays of up to four years
attended the resolution of some cases filed under the panel system. Id. The court
went on to state that: "No extraordinary circumstances have been offered to explain
this intolerable delay." Id. The court further found that as of May 31, 1980,
thirty-eight percent of the claims filed in 1977, sixty-five per cent of the claims
filed in 1978, and eighty-five percent of the claims filed in 1979 remained unresolved.
Id. The court concluded that "[s]uch delays are unconscionable and irreparably
rip the fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial
system." Id.
182. Margolick, Suit Filed to Abolish Medical Malpractice Panels, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 1983, at 40, col. 1. The author states that "[i]nstead of speeding up the
process ... the panels have created another time consuming step. Litigants in
Manhattan ... must now wait up to four years to get a panel convened .... .
Id. at cols. 4, 5.
183. See Screening Panels, supra note 160, at 959.
184. 1985 N.Y. LAWS ch. 294 § 14.
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the methods used by those counties where panels have been most
successful with those used in counties where their success has been
more limited. Thus, the legislature hopes that these provisions will
enable it to determine whether, and under what conditions, it should
allow panels to continue to operate. 18
C. Reducing the Incidence of Malpractice
Section 3 of the Bill is directed toward reducing the incidence of
medical malpractice. 189 This provision attempts to achieve this goal
by requiring each hospital in the state to establish a quality assurance
committee to review hospital services and to "ensure that information
gathered pursuant to the program is utilized to review and revise
hospital policies and procedures" 19 in order to facilitate the pre-
vention of malpractice. The provision also requires each hospital
to periodically review the credentials and competence of all hospital
personnel' 9' and to establish grievance committees to resolve patient
complaints that may otherwise result in malpractice claims. 92
Maintenance and collection of information "concerning the hos-
pital's experience with negative health care outcomes and incidents
injurious to patients' '1 93 is also mandated. Each hospital is made
188. Id. The section provides:
The chief administrator of the courts shall conduct a study of the impact
of section fourteen of this act upon the dispositions of medical malpractice
actions in the fifth judicial district and in the county of Suffolk, as
compared to medical malpractice actions in the seventh judicial district
and in the county of Nassau. On or before January first, nineteen hundred
eighty-eight, the chief administrator shall prepare and transmit to the
legislature, the governor and the chief judge of the Court of Appeals a
report of his findings, including but not limited to numbers of actions
brought, speed with which cases reached final disposition, and the impact
of the panels on the adjudication of the action, together with any
appropriate recommendations.
Id.
189. PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM, supra note 106, at 9.
190. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
191. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(l)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986). This section
provides for the "periodic review of the credentials, physical and mental capacity
and competence in delivering health care services of all persons who are employed
or associated with the hospital." Id.
192. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(l)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (section
requires each hospital to develop "[al procedure for the prompt resolution of
grievances by patients or their representatives related to accidents, injuries, treatment
and other events that may result in claims of medical or dental malpractice").
193. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(l)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1986). This in-
formation would also include patient grievances, professional liability premiums,
settlements, awards, costs incurred by the hospital for patient injury prevention
and safety improvement activities. Id.
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responsible for creating education programs for hospital staff dealing
with patient safety, injury prevention, and the legal aspects of patient
care.'9 Each hospital must also maintain continuing education pro-
grams for medical staff in their area of specialty. 9
Furthermore, this section of the Bill requires each hospital, before
granting or renewing staff privileges, to obtain from each physician
the name of any hospital with which he has had previous association,
the reason for his terminating such association, and information
concerning any past or pending medical malpractice action against
him. 9 The provision requires all hospitals to honor any request for
such information coming from another hospital, and absolves the
hospital from any civil liability for providing such information. 97
Any person who "in good faith and without malice" participates
on a quality assurance committee or provides information to further
the prevention of medical malpractice is also absolved from civil
liability. 198
194. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(l)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1986). These
educational programs would address staff responsibility for reporting professional
misconduct. Id. In addition, they would improve communication between staff and
patients. Id.
195. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(l)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
196. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-k(l)(a)(b)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Such
information would include:
The name of any hospital or facility with or at which the physician or
dentist had or has any association, employment, privileges or practice
... [w]here such association, employment, privilege or practice was
discontinued, the reasons for its discontinuation ... [and any pending
professional medical or dental misconduct proceedings or any pending
medical malpractice actions in this state or another state, the substance
of the allegations in such proceedings or actions, and any additional
information concerning such proceedings or actions as the physician or
dentist may deem appropriate.
Id.
197. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-k(4) (McKinney Supp. 1986). This section
provides:
Any hospital which receives a request for information from another
hospital pursuant to subdivision one or two of this section shall provide
such information concerning the physician or dentist in question to the
extent such information is known to the hospital receiving such a request,
including the reasons for suspension, termination, curtailment of em-
ployment or privileges at the hospital. Any hospital or hospital employee
providing such information in good faith shall not be liable in any civil
action for the release of such information.
Id.
198. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986). This section
provides:
Any person who, in good faith and without malice, provides information
to further the purposes of the medical and dental malpractice prevention
program or who, in good faith and without malice, participates on the
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V. Recommendations
A. The Bill's Expected Impact on Insurance Premiums
Although the Bill's provisions will provide some measure of benefit
to patients, insurance carriers and physicians, they will do little to
reduce malpractice insurance premiums. 99 Moreover, like previous
reforms, they fail to address the tort claims system's most glaring
inadequacies. 100
First, section 9 of the Bill, which establishes periodic payment of
future damages, 0' provides that only the interest earned by the
insurance company on the investment of future installments before
they are paid will be deductible from malpractice insurance pre-
miums.20 The only other possible savings represented by this pro-
vision are future damages for non-economic losses, such as pain
and suffering, of plaintiffs who die before they can collect the entire
award.0 3 Thus, additional reductions in premiums would occur only
if juries have overestimated plaintiffs' life-expectancies.' 4 Finally, at
least a portion of any savings resulting from this provision will be
consumed in administering the periodic payment of installments.205
quality assurance committee shall not be subject to an action for civil
damages or other relief as a result of such activity.
Id.
199. See Malpractice Legislation, supra note 23, at 667-88, 690-91 (examining such
reforms as screening panels, constraints on contingency fees, limits on awards for
non-economic damages, and reporting requirements similar to those enacted by Governor
Cuomo's Bill, id. at 667-88, and concluding that "[tlhe quickest cures may not be the
best and, as in fact appears to have happened, may treat only the selected symptoms
and provide only temporary relief with undesirable side effects").
200. See generally Malpractice Legislation, supra note 23, at 691. While reforms like
those enacted in Governor Cuomo's Bill address the symptoms of the malpractice
crisis, i.e., rising premiums, what is really needed is "a detailed evaluation of the
comprehensive problem considering statutory changes that will lead to diagnoses
and treatment of the root causes of malpractice as well as to alternative reparations
systems." Id.
201. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 5031 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
202. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD.
L. REV. 489, 507 (1977).
203. Id.
204. Id. On the other hand, if juries have generally been underestimating plain-
tiffs' life-expectancies, or such estimations have been randomly inaccurate, the
provision would result in no overall savings. See id.
205. Id. at 508. Section 5036 provides:
If, at any time after entry of judgment, a judgment creditor or successor
in interest can establish that the continued payment of the judgment in
periodic installments will impose a hardship, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, order that the remaining payments or a portion thereof shall be
made to the judgment creditor in a lump sum. The court shall, before
entering such an order, find that: (i) unanticipated and substantial medical,
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Second, while section 15 of the Bill decreases the share of each
award going to pay plaintiffs' attorneys, it does nothing on its face
to reduce the total amount of damages awardable in a malpractice
suit.2°6 Furthermore, there is no evidence that decreasing contingency
fees in any way affects the jury's determination of an appropriate
award. 20 7 Indeed, the one study that has been done on this subject
discovered that such reforms had no effect on damages recovered.208
Finally, while the legislature has decreased the attorney's share of
the malpractice award, it has done nothing to reduce the cost of
prosecuting a malpractice claim. These costs may be advanced by
plaintiff's attorney. 209
The final obstacle to any reduction in malpractice insurance pre-
miums resulting from these provisions is posed by section 18 of the
Bill. Section 18 provides that physicians insured in the amount of
$1,000,000 per claimant and $3,000,000 for all claimants, for any
one year, shall be entitled to purchase coverage of an additional
$1,000,000 per claimant and an additional $3,000,000 for all claimants
for any one year. °10 By requiring insurers to provide double coverage
dental or other needs have arisen that warrant the payment of the
remaining payments, or a portion thereof, in a lump sum; (ii) ordering
such a lump sum payment would not impose an unreasonable financial
burden on the judgment debtor or debtors; (iii) ordering such a lump
sum payment will accommodate the future medical and other needs of
the judgment creditor; and (iv) ordering such a lump sum payment would
further the interests of justice.
N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAW § 5036 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
206. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
207. Jenkins & Schweinfurth, supra note 71 at 943.
If it is assumed, on the other hand, that jurors give excessive awards
only on the understanding that a large portion thereof goes to plaintiff-
attorneys, then it may be surmised that lower ... insurance premiums
will be effected. Again, it is important to note the tenuous link between
claims paid out and insurance rates. Moreover, no study has ever presented
any direct evidence that juries consider attorneys' fees in coming to a
verdict.
Id.
208. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149-62 (1966).
209. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBMITY, DR 5-103 (McKinney 1975) which
states, "[Al lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including
court costs, expenses of medical examinations, and cost of obtaining and presenting
evidence."
210. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5502(l)(e) (McKinney 1986).
In addition, any applicant insured by the association in an amount equal
to or greater than one million dollars for each claimant and three million
dollars for all claimants in any one year ... shall be entitled to purchase
a policy from the association providing excess coverage of at least one
million dollars per claimant and three million dollars for all claimants
in any one year.
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upon request, the legislature has enabled potential plaintiffs to recover
twice as much as they could have previously."' Although the ad-
ditional premiums represented by section 18 will, in part, be paid
by hospitals, the health care consumer will remain the one who
ultimately bears this new burden."2
A number of states have attempted to reduce malpractice premiums
by placing arbitrary limits on amounts recoverable for non-economic
losses such as pain and suffering.2 3 Of the six such statutes enacted
in the United States, two have survived judicial scrutiny.2 14 While
such a provision has been proposed in New York, it has yet to be
enacted into law. 2 5 Even if such a provision were to be enacted,
its effect on premiums would be minimal, for damage awards make
up only a small part of each premium dollar.21 6
Sections 10 and 4(d)(l) of the Bill, which seek to reduce premiums
by reducing the number of claims proceeding to trial, are steps in
the right direction. Section 11, which allows the court to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a "frivolous" action, has
received some favorable comment from physicians.21 7 However, the
211. See Editorial, Albany Malpractice, Syracuse Times, Jan. 29, 1985, Editorial
Page (arguing that instead of limiting claims against physicians, the Bill enables
malpractice claimants to sue for larger recoveries).
212. "The Legislature is telling us that the additional premiums will be paid by
hospitals. What the Legislature is not saying is that the hospitals can pass the cost
on to patients, putting already astronomical hospital bills really out of sight." Id.
213. For a list of statutes placing a ceiling on awards for non-economic damages,
see supra note 24.
214. Two cases upholding such statutes are: Fein v. Permanente, 121 Cal. App.
3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1981), superseded, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal denied, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980). Four cases invalidating such
legislation are: Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,
3 Ohio Op. 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v.
Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
215. Gargan, Doctors and Insurers Press For Limits on Malpractice Awards,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1983, at B4, col. 1. The Medical Liability Mutual Reform
Coalition-an organization of doctors, insurers, and businesspeople-wrote a com-
prehensive malpractice reform bill that was introduced in the state senate in 1983.
Id. In addition to many of the provisions contained in the Bill, this proposal also
included a provision limiting awards for non-economic damages to $100,000. Id.
216. For one commentator's estimate of how each premium dollar is ultimately
divided among attorneys, plaintiffs, and insurers, see supra note 155.
217. See BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 12-13. The Medical
Liability Mutual Reform Coalition proposed a provision that would require plaintiffs
in malpractice actions to post a bond covering costs incurred by defendants, including
legal fees, in the event that the plaintiff decided to proceed to trial in the face
of an adverse panel determination. Id. The bond would be forfeited if the court
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discretionary nature of such awards could hinder the statute's de-
terrent effect.2 ' This drawback could be eliminated by striking the
provision's discretionary aspect-in other words, requiring payment
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in all but extraordinary
cases.219 Section 4(d)(1), which subjects to discovery all information
relating to expert witnesses, is probably the most effective compro-
mise between weeding out frivolous suits and keeping the courtroom
door open to meritorious ones. 220
Section 3 of the Bill, which is directed toward reducing the in-
cidence of malpractice, is consistent with the recommendations of
the American Bar Association in that it provides immunity from
civil liability for certain exchanges of information. 221 Indeed, the
American Bar Association has recommended the establishment of a
national system of information gathering and exchange, through
which medical institutions, organizations, and authorized personnel
could routinely obtain information concerning disciplinary actions
taken in their own and other states. 22 However, even if these pro-
visions do help to eliminate incompetent physicians, it is doubtful
that they will have an appreciable effect on the incidence of mal-
practice litigation. Most medical malpractice results not from phy-
sician incompetence, but from the mistakes of normally competent
physicians, or from the failure of normally reliable procedures. 23
finally found for the defendant. Id. The Coalition stated that the purpose of this
provision would be to "reduce significantly the continuance of unfounded, frivolous,
and nuisance claims .... ." Id. at 13.
218. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56(1) (West Supp. 1985), which allows for the
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in all medical malpractice actions.
219. Florida's spurious claims statute, which requires the losing party in a medical
malpractice action to pay all attorney's fees in all but extraordinary cases, has
survived constitutional attack on four separate occasions. E.g., Pohlman v. Mat-
thews, 440 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Karlin v. Denson, 447 So. 2d
897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Young v. Altenhaus, 448 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), quashed in part, 472 So. 2d 1152 (1985) (holding the statute not
applicable to actions accruing before the statute became effective); Davis v. North
Shore Hosp., 452 So. 2d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). But see Spence v. Roth,
Closing the Courthouse Door: Florida's Spurious Claims Statute, 10 STETsoN L.
REv. 397 (1981). The authors contend that Florida's attorney's fee statute is unduly
restrictive in that it deters all malpractice victims from asserting their claims. Id.
at 403.
220. See Expert Witness, supra note 140, at 71-72.
221. American Bar Association, 1977 Report of the Commission on Professional
Liability 33 [hereinafter cited as Professional Liability].
223. Malpractice Legislation, supra note 23 at 687.
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B. Alternative Directions for Future Reform Efforts
1. Fundamental Flaws in the Tort Claims System
The Bill's major flaw is that it fails to provide the fundamental
reform that the tort claims system requires.224 The tort claims system
is supposed to compensate the injured25 and deter potential tort-
feasors. 2 6 Compensation in medical malpractice cases is under-in-
clusive, expensive, and slow. 227 In addition, the system's deterrent
aspect has done nothing to promote improved health care in New
York State. 228 On the contrary, it has done much to increase costs,
cripple innovation, and erode the doctor-patient relationship. 229
According to a consensus of participants in a conference at the
Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, most people who sustain
mediczal injuries, either through negligence or unavoidable accident,
do not get into the claims system; consequently, they receive no
compensation. 20 First, because it is fault-oriented, the present system
automatically denies its benefits to those who are injured in the
absence of negligence.2 1  In addition, many claims will not yield
224. See infra notes 225-243 and accompanying text.
225. "The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford
compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of
another." W.L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984).
226. "[Djamages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation
for the injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant . . .and of deterring
others from following the defendant's example." Id. § 2, at 9.
227. See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text. But see Taylor, Medical
Malpractice Costs Debated at Hearing, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at A23, cols.
1, 4 (quoting Dr. Patricia Danzon as testifying at a senate hearing in Wash-
ington "that the current legal system, under which physicians and hospitals are
liable to patients injured by negligent medical care 'is worth retaining as a system
of quality control, a deterrent to malpractice' ") [hereinafter cited as Medical Mal-
practice Hearing].
229. See generally Carlson, A Conceptualization of a No-Fault Compensation
System For Medical Injuries, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 329, 335 (1972-73) (The tort
claims system is responsible for "higher settlements and verdicts . . . escalating
insurance premiums; and the incalculable cost of defensive medicine. . . .") [here-
inafter cited as No-Fault Compensation]. It has been asserted that the fear of
litigation causes physicians to opt for more conservative methods of treatment, and
to "refuse to apply promising new techniques in favor of tried and true procedures."
Id. at 334. But see Medical Malpractice Hearing, supra note 228.
230. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4 (D. McDonald, ed. 1971) (citation omitted); see
also C. KRAMER, THE NEGLIGENT DOCTOR 15-18 (1968) (stating that the then current
levels of malpractice actions represented only a small portion of those actions which
could have been brought).
231. "[Mjany patients injured as they pass through the health care system are
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recoveries high enough to merit the attention of a competent at-
torney.
232
In addition to being selective in a manner that has only a
tenuous relation to the needs of the injured, the tort claims system
is often painfully slow in dispensing its largesse. Often, as many as
eight years lapse from the time the plaintiff files his claim to the
time the jury hands down its verdict. 233 Even if the plaintiff wins
at the trial level, there is often an appeal, or several appeals, which
can add another year or two before he is finally paid-assuming,
of course, that the final appeal is decided in his favor. 234
In addition to the system's inadequacy as a vehicle for providing
compensation, it is almost useless as a deterrent. Malpractice in-
surance protects the potential tortfeasor from damage awards. 235 Also,
premium increases are determined according to the geographic lo-
cation and specialty of the individual physician, and are rarely
influenced by the practitioner's record of claims, settlements, and
adverse verdicts. 23 6 The vast majority of actual tortfeasors in New
York pay almost no surcharge on their premiums. 237 Thus, the
negligent physician ends up paying no more than does the careful
one.
238
Far from promoting improved health care, the tort claims system
may be crippling the medical establishment. 23 9 Doctors have re-
sponded to the rising incidence of litigation by spending more and
more time and money to avoid liability in ways that do not benefit
the patient. 240 In the words of one commentator:
not compensated for their injuries. Among the uncompensated are those patients
whose injuries were not caused by negligence or who could not prove negligence."
Medical Malpractice Damage A wards, supra note 11, at 990 (emphasis in original).
232. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4 (D. McDonald ed. 1971); see also J.B. SPENCE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 279, 283-84 (Practicing Law Instit. No. 68, 1974) (practicing
attorney warns colleagues that because of the time and expense of litigating mal-
practice cases, only the most substantial cases should be accepted).
233. What's the Cure For Bad Medicine, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1985, at 30,
col. 1.
234. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 512 (1976)[hereinafter
cited as Elective No-Fault].
235. See Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 1978 NEW
ENO. J. OF MED. 1282, 1287.
236. Id.
237. Malpractice Damage Awards, supra note 10, at 981, n.42.
238. Id. at 980-81.
239. See No-Fault Compensation, supra note 229, at 338.
240. Bait. Sun, Nov. 22, 1975, at Bl, col. 4. Close to one billion dollars a
year was being spent nationally at that time on largely unnecessary x-rays that
doctors ordered to protect themselves from potential malpractice claims. Id.
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It has become commonplace for physicians to order complete x-
ray studies of an injured limb even without the slightest indication
of a fracture. Needless to say, the x-rays can add [twenty] to
[thirty] dollars to the patient's bill even though they may be
unwarranted in ninety-nine out of one hundred cases . . . . In
addition to x-rays, physicians now frequently recommend medical
consultations even when there are no positive medical grounds
for such specialized services .... In still other cases, physicians
are ordering additional laboratory tests, additional hospitalization,
and additional nursing care, both to minimize the chances of
being sued for malpractice and to guarantee the successful defense
of any suit which might be instituted. 24'
In addition to promoting such "defensive medicine," the epidemic
of malpractice litigation is causing a significant number of physicians
to decline to perform services in certain circumstances, or to abandon
procedures they are fully qualified to perform, or to retire from
practice much earlier than they would under more congenial cir-
cumstances . 242
2. A No-Fault System of Recovery
Unlike Governor Cuomo's Bill, a no-fault system of recovery
would address those problems afflicting the tort claims system that
previous reform efforts have left untouched. Such a system would
focus on determining the existence of injury and the appropriate
compensation and not the existence of fault. 243 A no-fault plan would
241. Testimony of Eli Bernzweig of the Dep't of HEW, Center of Malpractice
Claims Prevention to the Ribicoff Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization (1968),
reprinted in No-Fault Compensation, supra note 229, at 338. On the other hand,
a survey financed by the Committee on Legal Issues in Health Care tentatively
concluded that while "[t]he threat of a malpractice suit does induce physicians to
overutilize diagnostic tests and procedures in particular cases ... the practice is
not extensive and probably not a contributing factor to the rising cost of medical
care." Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 964. The survey consisted of interviews of 66 physicians
at Duke University Medical Center, and questionnaires sent to 100 physicians in
California and North Carolina. Id. at 953-55. The survey further concluded that
"significant overutilization of our medical resources occurs and can be explained
only by factors other than malpractice." Id.
242. Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 599
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]. Indeed, Mr. Keeton goes on to say that "the
inducement toward withdrawal from practice is accentuated in some areas of the
country by such dramatic increases in malpractice insurance premium rates, and
even in unavailability of malpractice insurance, that some physicians find the choice
of continuing in practice economically as well as psychologically unattractive." Id.
243. Id. at 601.
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thus pay expenses caused by all treatment-related injuries, whether
or not the physician is negligent. 2" By eliminating the fault finding
mechanism of the trial process, a no-fault system would save both
time and money. 45 Finally, such an arrangement would preserve for
the patient a greater share of his reimbursible damages because he
would not be sharing his award with an attorney. 246
A no-fault system should survive constitutional scrutiny. The due
process right to sue for damages is subject to legislative change. 247
In New York Central Railroad Co. v. White,2"4 the United States
Supreme Court upheld New York's workmen's compensation statute,
suggesting but not requiring that the right to sue for damages could
be replaced by a legislatively enacted compensation scheme if that
scheme was a "reasonable substitute. ' 249 The Court's later decision
in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. ,250
provides additional support for legislative enactments limiting the
liability of injured persons in deference to a broader societal goal,
so long as the substitution is "reasonably just."' 25' In setting this
standard of review, the Court stated that the burden is on the one
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature
has acted in an "arbitrary and irrational way. ''52
A system based on no-fault is, at the very least, a reasonable
attempt to remedy the most glaring inadequacies of the tort claims
244. Havighurst & Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance, A No-Fault Approach
to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 INs. L.J. 69, 70 (1974).
245. See Keeton, supra note 242, at 603.
246. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
247. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877). The Court stated:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common
law .... Rights of property which have been created by the common
law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law ... may
be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless
prevented by constitutional limitations.
Id. at 134.
248. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
249. 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917). The Court noted:
Nor is it necessary ... that a State might, without violence to the
constitutional guaranty of "due process of law" suddenly set aside all
common law rules respecting liability as between employer and employee,
without providing a reasonably just substitute .... No such question
is here presented, and we intimate no opinion upon it.
Id.
250. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
251. Id. at 88. Duke Power upheld the Price Anderson Act, which imposed a
$560 million limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation
of federally licensed nuclear power plants. Id.
252. Id. at 83 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976)).
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system.253 In exchange for his right to sue for damages, the medical
malpractice plaintiff will receive compensation that is comprehensive,
inexpensive, and immediate. 2 4 In addition, by eliminating the need
to assign blame, no-fault should do away with defensive medicine. 255
Two primary difficulties attend the application of no-fault to
medical malpractice. First, the money saved by eliminating the trial
process may not balance the money spent answering the additional
claims that would be brought under a no-fault system. 2 6 The second
difficulty is defining the compensible event. 257 It is neither fair nor
feasible to compensate every patient for the consequences of treat-
ment yielding an unsatisfactory result. Accepting this initial premise,
how does one determine whether the patient was injured in the
course of treatment, or suffered the natural consequences of the
condition that originally sent him to the health care provider? 258
One possible solution to this problem can be found in the "Medical
Adversity Insurance" system ("MAI"). 2 9 This system would com-
pensate any adverse medical outcome appearing on a pre-determined
list.260 Any injury not appearing on the list, including failure to
obtain informed consent, abandonment of the patient, gross neg-
ligence, intentional misconduct, and illegal behavior, would be left
to the tort claims system. 26' Administrative adjudication or arbitra-
tion, with the compulsory cooperation of the health care provider,
253. The Supreme Court's rationale for workmen's compensation is equally applica-
ble to medical malpractice:
[I]n the highly organized and hazardous industries of the present day
the causes of accidents are often so obscure and complex that in a
material proportion of cases it is impossible by any method correctly to
ascertain the facts necessary to form an accurate judgment ....
New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917). For a discussion
of the success of workmen's compensation, see O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance For
Injuries Arising From Medical Malpractice: A Proposal For Elective Coverage, 26
EMORY L.J. 21 (1975). But see Ring, The Fault with No-Fault, 49 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 796 (1974); Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction & Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.J.
15 (1973).
254. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
255. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 244, at 69-70.
256. See Elective No-Fault, supra note 234, at 517.
257. In a study conducted by the California Medical Association and the Cal-
ifornia Hospital Association, researchers found that of the disabilities caused by
health care management, 17 percent involved probable liability of the health care
provider. Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, 128 WEST. J. OF MED. 360-
65 (Apr. 1978).
258. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 244, at 70.
259. Elective No-Fault, supra note 234, at 521.
260. This system is comprehensively described in Havighurst & Tancredi, supra,
note 244, and supra notes 259-67 and accompanying text.




would be employed to determine the cause of the patient's injury. 262
Patients would be compensated under MAI for medical and
hospital expenses, as well as for loss of earnings incurred as a result
of medical injury. 26 Compensation for "pain and suffering" would
be awardable in some cases either in fixed amounts, or according
to a specified percentage of medical expenses. Awards for pain and
suffering would vary in amount according to whether discomfort
was transitory or permanent .26
MAI contains other useful guidelines for a possible no-fault system.
Under MAI, health care providers would be required to purchase
from a private insurer a policy of "medical adversity insurance"
covering their patients. 26 This policy would provide compensation
for all medical and hospital expenses, as well as loss of wages up
to a predetermined maximum weekly amount. 26 The system would
also compensate collateral sources of recovery, thereby eliminating
patient windfall. 261 In addition, statutory obligations would be im-
posed on health care providers to inform patients of the existence
of a claim within a prescribed period of time after its recognition,
or pay the amount of the claim. 26
(1) post-operative infections; (2) thrombophlebitis and embolism; (3) cath-
eter infections; (4) allergic reactions to antibiotics and other drugs; (5)
blood transfusion reactions; (6) foreign bodies; (7) hospital accidents; (8)
adverse consequences during experimental treatment; and (9) secondary
injuries from surgery.
Id. at 76. These events are relatively frequent occurrences and, therefore, their
inclusion is meant to be suggestive only. Id. at 76. Greater specification is needed
and a complete examination has yet to be undertaken. Id.
262. Id. at 76. Because these behavioral lapses are contrary to special societal
expectations regarding professional conduct, their inclusion in a no-fault system
would be inappropriate. Id.
263. Id. at 74.
264. Id. at 72.
265. Id. at 71.
266. Id.
267. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 244, at 71. Loss of wages beyond a
specified weekly level would not be compensated because persons in higher income
brackets could be expected to insure themselves. The authors would also prescribe
a minimum figure limiting recovery for loss of wages by people not "actually or
lucratively employed-housewives, children and the poor for example." Id.
268. Id. at 72. Under current New York law, damage recoveries in malpractice
actions are reduced by the amounts collected from collateral sources recovery, thus
eliminating windfalls to plaintiffs. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4545(a) (McKinney 1963
& Supp. 1986). Under MAI, however, compensating collateral sources of recovery
through the malpractice insurance policy would reduce the cost of health care and
disability insurance, and employer sick-pay plans. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra
note 244, at 72.
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VI. Conclusion
The primary problem with Governor Cuomo's medical malpractice
reform bill is that it attempts to reduce medical malpractice insurance
premiums while ignoring the major flaws in the medical malpractice
tort claims system.2 69 At the same time, the Bill's provisions will
not make significant headway in achieving its stated objective-
reducing insurance premiums. 70
The tort claims system is inherently time consuming, under-inclu-
sive, and expensive. 7' A system based on no-fault, however, will
provide prompt compensation to those injured by medical acci-
dents.2 72 In addition, it will compensate many who, despite the extent
of their injuries, are currently excluded from recovery under the tort
claims system.27 Finally, a no-fault system would eliminate the most
expensive component of the tort claims system-the trial process. 274
Unfortunately, there is, as yet, insufficient data to allow analysts
to determine whether the money saved by a no-fault system would
be balanced by the expense of paying the additional claims that
such a system would address.275
Mark Monaco
269. Id. at 73.
270. See supra notes 224-42 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 199-223 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text. An article in the New York
Times stated that some opponents of the medical malpractice tort claims system,
including Professor Guido Calabresi, Dean of Yale Law School, have stated that
malpractice litigation is "expensive, confusing and capricious; failing both to com-
pensate many deserving victims and to punish or deter negligent doctors .... .
Medical Malpractice: Role of Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at A16, col.
4. The article further quoted Professor Calabresi as stating that "Itihe way we
handle malpractice cases is quite grotesque .... Instead of trying to find solutions
for the victim of medical catastrophes, doctors and lawyers are blaming one another
and saying each is money grubbing. It's demeaning to both professions." Id.
273. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 244, at 69.
274. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 114.
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